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 1 Introduction
Liquidity can be understood as the ability to transform long-term assets into current con-
sumption goods. In that sense, secondary markets play a crucial role in liquidity provision.
However, we know from Akerlof (1970) that adverse selection may prevent such markets
to work properly. What I present here is a model in which the fear of a market breakdown
due to adverse selection might induce agents to adopt behaviors that would actually cause
such a breakdown. In that case, it becomes extremely costly to transform long-term assets
into consumption goods, which is the rationale for calling such an episode a self-fulﬁlling
liquidity dry-up.
I build a three-date model in which ex-ante identical agents invest in long-term risky
projects. They also have access to a riskless one-period storage technology. If successful,
long-term projects yield a better return than storage, and conversely if they fail. Agents
privately observe the quality (success or failure) of their projects at the interim date. At this
point, they might want to realize a share of their long-term projects due either to that private
information or to provide for current consumption needs. Because of adverse selection, the
price they can get on the secondary market is determined by the average seller’s motive for
trading. There is therefore a return-liquidity trade-off: long-term investment is on average
more productive but liquidation on the secondary market might be endogenously costly
because of adverse selection.1
Firstly, I explain how adverse selection may lead to self-fulﬁlling liquidity dry-ups.
This is the main contribution of the paper. Then, as a secondary contribution, I introduce
heterogeneity in preferences and discuss the interactions between idiosyncratic illiquidity
shocks, market liquidity, and risk sharing.
In my model, adverse-selection-driven illiquidity leads to multiple equilibria for a wide
range of parameter values. In this case, when agents expect the market to be illiquid, they
optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of non-productive but liquid assets.
Such a response has negative externalities as it reduces ex-post market participation which
worsens adverse selection and dries up market liquidity. I derive the condition under which
suchanoutcomeisParetoinefﬁcientandIshowhowtheGovernmentcanruleitout. Apub-
lic liquidity insurance scheme implements the second-best allocation because the prospect
of a market bailout suppresses the return-liquidity trade-off. This prevents wasteful self-
insurance, boosts long-term investment and ex-post market participation, which then has a
positive feedback effect on liquidity.
If agents anticipate that high market liquidity will render storage wasteful, they fully
invest in the long-run technology. Consequently, any resource an agent consumes before its
projects pay off should have been planned to come from liquidation on the secondary mar-
ket. This is true irrespective of the agent’s project quality, which implies full participation
to the secondary market and a relatively high proportion of claims to high-return projects;
liquidity is thus indeed high. However, if agents believe the market will become illiquid -
that liquidation will hurt- they choose to self-insure. Therefore, they optimally store part of
their initial resources; they hoard liquidity. Optimal self-insurance should naturally prevent
liquidation in states of nature where the opportunity cost is high. Accordingly, market par-
ticipation will thus be limited and the agents with high-return projects are the ﬁrst ones to
exit. As liquidity decreases with average quality, this can account for another equilibrium
where illiquidity is a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
Whereas the decision to self-insure is individually optimal in a low-liquidity world, it is
1This concept of adverse-selection-driven endogenous liquidity in asset markets is introduced by Eisfeldt
(2004). In her model, current needs for resources depend on past decisions and on information about future
income. Thus, there can be reasons (e.g. consumption smoothing in the case of a negative income shock) to
sell high quality claims, even at a discount. The higher the discount one concedes to sell a good asset, the lower
its liquidity. Similarly, the higher the proportion of agents trading for consumption-smoothing or risk-sharing
purposes (instead of private information about payoffs), the lower the adverse selection and the higher the liquidity
of the market.
1socially costly in two respects. First because it wastes resources on the storage technology
(long-run investment is on average more productive) and, second, because self-insurance
hinders risk sharing since it ex-post prevents agents from providing the positive external-
ities associated with the issuance of claims to high-return projects. The fact that liquidity
hoarding might be wasteful is not new (see for instance Diamond (1997), Holmström and
Tirole (1998), and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008)) and the feedback effect between
liquidity and investment is present in Eisfeldt (2004). However, that a liquidity dry-up can
endogenously arise for the very reason that investors self-insure against it is a new result.
As the market may fail to allocate resources efﬁciently, expectations about market liq-
uidity have a crucial impact on welfare. Because the Government can prevent the underly-
ing coordination failure, the model has policy implications. Potential welfare losses may
indeed arise if the law-maker overlooks the “liquidity expectation channel” when consider-
ing public intervention in the case of ﬁnancial crisis. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008)
ﬁnd similar results in a model with Knightian uncertainty.
When one thinks of ﬁnancial institutions, including their off-balance structured invest-
ment vehicles, like the investors in my model, the low-liquidity equilibrium of my model
ﬁts to the current situation of the securitization business quite well. This equilibrium ex-
hibits low volume and low prices in the secondary market, together with liquidity hoarding
behavior. Whereas cash-in-the-market pricing (CITM) models2 are probably more appeal-
ing to study the unfolding of the liquidity crisis, my model as something more to say about
the persistence of illiquidity in securitization markets. Indeed, CITM models rely on the
inelasticity of short-term funding, they are thus designed to capture short-term phenomena.
My model, however, allows for the presence of deep-pocket agents. Therefore, the story
it tells, contrarily to CITM models, does not suggest a V-shaped recovery as it can actu-
ally account for illiquidity markets, despite the availability of external resources. Whether
there is still a lack of cash in these markets is a possibility, but the recent low yields on
short-term T-Bills, despite a surge in supply, and the tremendously high excess reserves
of US depository institutions suggest that there must be cash available in some other mar-
kets. Adverse-selection-driven illiquidity can thus be viewed as an appealing mechanism
to explain persistent liquidity dry-ups.
To expose the secondary contribution of the paper, I consider heterogeneous prefer-
ences: as in the banking literature, agents face idiosyncratic illiquidity shocks.
When the realization of such shocks is private information, I ﬁnd that market liquidity
improves. Becauseilliquid(thosethatare hitbytheshocks)agentsissueclaimsirrespective
of the underlying project return, it indeed reduces adverse selection. As market liquidity
improves risk sharing, this suggests that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks need not be socially
a bad thing. Also, when there exists a technology that enables them to disclose their liq-
uidity position, ex-post illiquid agents are better-off under disclosure. It isolates them from
the negative externalities exerted by liquid lemon owners. However, ex-post liquid agents
incur a bigger liquidity discount because the probability that they try to sell a lemon, con-
ditionally to have a good liquidity position, increases. Therefore the effect on ex-ante risk
sharing is ambiguous. This last result illustrates the ambiguity of transparency on liquidity
suggested by Holmström (2008).
The relationship I show between liquidity, self-insurance and risk sharing complements
the literature on the competing role of banks and markets for the provision of liquidity. In
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is no market and banks can generally provide liquidity
and improve on the autarky allocation. Jacklin (1987) shows that this is not the case if
there exists a secondary market because the demand deposit contract is no longer incentive
compatible. Diamond (1987) generalizes these results with a model of exogenous limited
market participation. He ﬁnds that the lower the participation in the market, the greater
the role of the banking sector. In that respect, the key differences of my model are that
2See Allen and Gale (1994) for a theory of cash-in-the-market pricing and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Morris and Shin (2004) and Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2009) for applications to liquidity dry-ups.
2limited market participation is endogenous and investors are needed to run the initial phase
of the project. Indeed, I assume that projects could not be run mutually in the ﬁrst period
and that there is no means by which agents could credibly commit to invest. Otherwise,
agents could form a coalition in order to pool resources and diversify idiosyncratic risk
away. This coalition would correspond to the bank3 in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and, as
there is no aggregate shock to the fundamentals in my model, it could implement the ﬁrst-
best allocation. These assumptions are strong, as real banks do pool individual resources.
However, there are frictions preventing them to ex-ante pool resources among themselves.
That securitization thrived until 2007 is, in itself, evidence of the limits to ex-ante pooling
of resources.
Finally, it is also worth stressing how my model differs from that of Plantin and Parlour
(2008). They propose a model in which banks issue loans to ﬁrms and may sell those loans
on a secondary market. The bank might then be tempted to shirk and not to monitor the
ﬁrm properly. They study the optimal contract between ﬁrms and banks and show that the
existence of a secondary market might be inefﬁcient from an ex-ante point of view. Their
paper shares with mine an important feature: a lemons problem on a secondary market
that has an effect on initial investment decisions. However, they focus on the implication
of the existence of a secondary market on the ex-ante optimal contract. While my model
abstracts from this dimension, its equilibrium approach with risk-averse agents delivers
results on self-insurance, risk-sharing and market liquidity that their model cannot capture.
Section 2 presents the model, section 3 studies liquidity dry-ups, section 4 applies the
model to the 2007-ongoing ﬁnancial crisis, section 5 considers the impact of idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks and section 6 concludes and draws the line for future research.
2 The Model
Technology
There are three dates (t = 0;1;2) with a unique consumption good that is also the unit of
account. At dates 0 and 1, investor have access to a risk-free one-period storage technology
that yields an exogenous rate of return r. At date 0, they have also access to a risky long-run
technology. Such projects are undertaken at date 0 and only pay off at date 2. They succeed
with probability q > 0, in which case they yield a return RH per unit invested. In case of
failure, which occurs with probability 1 q, they yield RL, with 0  RL < RH. Investors
are needed to initiate their own projects and have no means to credibly commit to properly
invest. Moral hazard concerns consequently restrict ex-ante risk-sharing4.
Projects cannot be physically liquidated at date 15. However, at that date, investors
may issue claims to their projects in a competitive and anonymous6 secondary market. For
simplicity, the output of the underlying project will be veriﬁable at date 2. Therefore, I
abstract from moral hazard problems once the project has been properly initiated7 . I do
not allow for short-selling and there are thus no other way to borrow against future income
than to issue claims to ongoing projects.
3To avoid confusion, such a bank would correspond to a coalition of investors (or of small banks, seen as
investors) in my model.
4There is a consequent literature on the role of banks for such purpose when contracts are available to pool
resources ex ante. See for instance Diamond and Dybvig (1983). What I study here is an economy in which such
pooling is not possible.
5Equally, I could consider that the physical liquidation costs outweigh the residual value.
6The anonymity assumption simpliﬁes the analysis. It might be seen as a strong one, but it is not required to
derive the main result.
7Moral hazard does of course play a crucial role in the funding of risky projects (see for instance Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Holmström and Tirole (1997 and 1998), and Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1989)). However, this paper focuses on adverse selection. It makes thus sense to contain the moral
hazard channel.
3To make the analysis interesting, I assume qRH +(1 q)RL > 1+r and RL < 1+r:
on average, long-term projects are more productive than storage, but they yield less than
storage in case of failure.
At the beginning of date 1, investors observe their project’s quality. This is private
information, and quality is common to all the projects of a given investor. We can thus
think of investors owning only one project of variable size. However, quality is independent
across agents. Average quality is thus deterministic.
Figure 1: The long term technology
Investors
There is a measure one of ex-ante (at t = 0) identical investors8 maximizing expected
utility, which they may derive from consumption at date 1 and 2. Their period utility
function u() is increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable. At date 0, they
are endowed with one unit of the consumption good which they may allocate between the
long-term risky investment and short-term storage.
These agents may face idiosyncratic illiquidity shocks: at date 1, they learn whether
they are normal or early consumers9. These two kinds of agents differ by the subjective
factor b they use to discount date-2 utility: b 2f0;1g with Prob(b =1)= p and 0< p1.
In the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and in line with Eisfeldt (2004), early agents
can also be viewed as agents incurring a need for liquidity due to either a current income
shock or a very good investment opportunity10. Patience is independent across agents and
is also independent of project returns. Ex-ante probabilities are common knowledge and
aggregate investment is observable once it has been committed. There is thus no aggregate
uncertainty in the fundamentals of this model. Ex-interim (at date 1) agents may thus differ
in two dimensions: project quality and patience, which make four potential types of agents
from that point in time. From an ex-ante point of view, these are four individual states of
nature.
The presence or not of early consumers (that is whether p<1 or p=1) does not matter
for the main contribution of the paper11. For this reason, and for the sake of simplicity, I
will assume them away until section (5) where I present the secondary results.
The time line
At date 0, investors:
8One can for instance think of these investors as entrepreneurs undertaking real projects or as banks issuing
loans. I use the word “investors” because I model their problem as a portfolio choice.
9Most authors that use such preference shocks use the terminology early and late to distinguish between types
of consumer. I do not stick to that terminology because whereas the typical late consumers do only care about
date 2 consumption, the normal agents of my model are standard consumption smoother.
10In Eisfeldt (2004), liquidity shocks are endogenous as they take the form of current income shocks and
information about future income shocks that both depend on past investment decisions.
11This is formally proved in the appendix.
4• Form anticipations about date-1 secondary market price.
• Choose l the share of endowment they invest in the long-term technology, the re-
maining being stored.
At date 1, they:
• Learn their true type: project return and patience.
• Choose how much claims to issue out of their long-term investment and how much
to consume at date 1 and store until date 2.
• Take P, the unit price at which they may issue claims on their projects (liquidate
them) as given.
At date 2:
• Projects pay off and output is distributed to claimants.
• Agents consume their remaining resources and die.
Demand for claims and market price
Thereisalsoameasure1of“deep-pocket”agentswhichhaveavailableresourcesbutdonot
haveaccesstothelong-termtechnology. Theyonlyhaveaccesstostorageandtothemarket
for claims to ongoing projects. For simplicity, they are risk-neutral, and hence they are
ready to buy any asset at the expected discounted value of the underlying payoffs. I assume
thus that they have, on aggregate, enough resources to clear the competitive secondary
market at that price.12
When project quality is private information, a key variable to determine asset prices on
secondary market is average quality (Akerlof 1970). As the deep-pocket agents have access
to the storage technology, a simple no-arbitrage argument sufﬁces to establish the market





Where h denotes the proportion of good quality claims in the secondary market. Note
that I do not need h to be directly observable since it could easily be inferred in equilib-
rium. Under the anonymous market assumption, it is without loss of generality that I only
consider a single unit price. In general, a unit price that is a decreasing function of quanti-
ties could be used by the buyers as a screening device. However, in an anonymous market,
sellers can always split their sales, which would render screening impossible.
Endogenous market liquidity
When there is at least one low-return claim on the market, claims to high-return projects are
sold (if any) at a discount with respect to RH=(1+r), the price that would prevail absent
asymmetry of information. It is in that sense that adverse selection makes high-quality
claims “illiquid”.
For it is a direct measure of the proportion of agents trading for other reasons than
private information about future payoffs and because it determines the illiquidity discount,
h embodies market liquidity in this model.
12Eisfeldt (2004) proposes an alternative formalization: she assumes that such agents are risk-averse and that
their endowment streams and utility function are such that they want to save, for instance for precautionary saving
motive. Then, she assumes perfect divisibility of claims and costless diversiﬁcation. This generates the same
perfectly elastic demand function.
5Equilibrium deﬁnition








That is, P is the unit price buyers are ready to pay for the average quality implied by
h; l is an optimal investment decision given P; and h is the proportion of high-return
claims in the market implied by optimal liquidation behavior at the level of investment l
and at price P.
There always exists at least one such equilibrium13. Uniqueness, however, depends on
parameter values. Roughly speaking, it at least requires that average project return E[R] is
low enough or sufﬁciently high. For all the intermediate cases, there are multiple equilibria.
3 Liquidity dry-ups
In this section, I solve the model backward and I show how the negative externalities linked
to self-insurance may lead to multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked according to
their respective level of market liquidity. To illustrate the crucial role of self-insurance on
liquidity and risk sharing, I also give a numerical example and compare equilibria with
a benchmark ﬁrst-best allocation. Then, I show how the Government can implement the
second-best by the mean of a public liquidity insurance scheme and I discuss policy impli-
cations.
Throughout this section, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1
• Return to storage is normalized: r = 0.
• All agents are normal: p = 1
• Projects succeed and fail with equal probabilities: q = 0:5
• Period utility is logarithmic: u(Ct) = lnCt
I only use assumption 1 for simplicity. The main results are extended to the general model
in the appendix.
3.1 Equilibria
A ﬁrst implication of assumption 1 is that there are only two types of date-1 agents and, by
the law of large number, they are exactly one half of each type. I therefore consider two
date-1 representative agents named after their type j 2 (H;L). Where H stands for agents
with high-return projects and L for low-return.
The problem of the agent
Long term investment is risky: on the one hand, it pays well in the case of success but, on
the other hand, it might yield a relatively low return in case of failure or early liquidation.
Conversely, storage yields the same amount in each state of nature and is liquid; it can be
consumed 1 to 1 at each period. There is thus a return-liquidity trade-off and risk-averse
agents might use storage to self-insure against the risk they face.






















RL=(1+r). Such a price pins down an equilibrium.
6Formally, at date 0, agents solve:
max
l;Lj;Sj






C1j +Sj = 1 l +LjP
C2j = (l  Lj)Rj +Sj
0  Lj  l  1
prob(j = H) = 0:5
Where Et[:] is the conditional (upon information available at date t) expectation opera-
tor14, l is the share of endowment invested in the long-term technology, and the following
variables are contingent on being in state of nature j: Ct j is consumption at date t , Sj  0
is storage between dates 1 and 2 , Lj is the number of claims (to unit projects) issued at
date 1.
The budget constraints state the following: date-1 resources consist of storage (1 l)
from date 0 plus the revenue from claim issuance (Lj) at the market price (P). These
resources can be consumed (C1j) or transferred to date 2 through storage (Sj). At date 2,
resources available for consumption consist of the output from long-term investment that
has not been liquidated (l  Lj)Rj plus storage from date 1.
To determine optimal behavior with respect to this trade-off, I solve the problem back-
ward.
Date-1 optimal liquidation policy
Let Lj(P;l) denote the optimal correspondence15 that solves the date-1 problem for agent
j for each couple (P;l). For simplicity, I restrict my analysis to prices that are consistent
with (1): P 2 [RL;RH]:
Agent L knows he owns lemons and he sells off any project he holds as soon as P>RL.
In the case P = RL, optimal liquidation is undetermined16. I assume for simplicity that he
sells off any project he holds too. Accordingly:
LL(P;l) = l (4)









C1H +SH = 1 l +LHP
C2H = (l  LH)RH +SH
0  LH  l








The intuition is the following. The optimal liquidation of agent H is weakly increasing
in P and in l. If both are high enough, Pl 1+l
2P is positive because the resources available
14Expectation is thus taken with respect to type, that is projects return. In the general model, expectation is also
taken with respect to patience (b).
15Lj(P;l) might not be a function. Indeed, an agent j may reach the same utility level for several values of L.
16At an optimum, the agent could choose to increase (decrease) liquidation a bit and increase (decrease) storage
to date 2 by the same amount, which would not affect utility.
7at date 1 (before liquidation) are smaller than the share of wealth he wants to dedicate to
consumption at that period. Conversely, if Pl 1+l
2P is negative, the agent would like to
“create” ongoing projects. This is of course ruled out by the deﬁnition of the long-term
technology. In that case, agent H does not participate in the market and LH(P;l)= 0. Note
that if l is really small, he might roll part of its storage over to date 2.
Date-0 optimal investment policy
Agents choose investment according to expected utility maximization.
Proposition 1 (self-insurance)
Let l(P)  argmax
l















With 0 < ˜ l < 1
2.
This proposition states that when P is anticipated to be smaller than the gross return
to storage, investment is low because it hurts to liquidate. Self-insurance is thus crowding
out productive investment. Conversely, if P is anticipated to be high, investment is high too
becauseitdominatesstorage-eveninthecaseofearlyliquidation-andmakesthustheagent





: whereas agent L is indifferent over the whole range of admissible
values [0;1], agent H is indifferent over this speciﬁc range and strictly prefers it to any
lower value. This is the reason why the optimal investment policy has not a functional
form at P = 1.
Proof: see appendix
Supply for claims and average quality
I can now evaluate the optimal liquidation functions (4) and (5) at the optimal investment






0 ;P < 1
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hilliq = 0 ;P < 1
hliq = 1







If the price is anticipated to be low, relative to return on storage, market participation is
anticipated to be limited: there will only be lemons in the market. However, in the case of
a high price, there is full participation and therefore there is a higher proportion of claims
to high-return projects in the market. The latter case implies a smaller discount and thus
greater market liquidity (recall that h is a direct measure of liquidity in this model).
8Equilibria and liquidity dry-ups
In this economy, the same fundamentals (RH; RL; r = 0; p = 1; q = 0;5) might lead to
multiple equilibria that primarily differ by their level of liquidity. Accordingly, I interpret
equilibria with the lowest level of liquidity as a liquidity dry-ups.






is the market price corresponding to a proportion of high-return projects h(P).
Therefore, a ﬁxed point P
0
=P pins down an equilibrium price (call it P) for the economy.
The corresponding values of l and h are given by (6) and (7) respectively.
Figure (2) gives an example with three equilibria for a given set of parameters.
Figure 2: Multiple equilibria (RH = 2:25 and RL = 0:75)
In a ﬁrst equilibrium, which I denote gilliq, agents anticipate a liquidity dry-up. They
take as given that the price will be low (P<1) and, according to proposition 1, they choose
l(P) = ˜ l < 1=2. This in turn imply that agents with high-return projects will not enter the
secondary market at date 1 and that the resulting liquidity will be low (h =0) which make
the anticipation of a low price a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: the liquidity has dried up.
Similar argument apply to gliq, the self-fulﬁlling high-liquidity equilibrium. Expecting
high liquidity, which means that liquidation does not hurt (P  1), agents invest only in
the long term technology. Given that investment is high (l = 1), agent H enters the
market, and its participation increases the proportion of trade for other reasons than private
information about future payoff. Hence, equilibrium liquidity and price are indeed high
(h > 1=3 and P = 1:2 ). Both equilibria are locally stable in the sense that agents best-
response to any small perturbation to the equilibrium price would bring the price back to
equilibrium. There is also an equilibrium (call it g1) which is unstable. As they are of
low economic relevance and they are not fundamental to my argument, I do not discuss
such unstable equilibria further in the text. However, an interpretation is proposed in the
appendix.
One might wonder if the example depicted in ﬁgure (2) is an exception. It is actually
much more part of the rule than an exception in such a setup. I formalize this statement in
proposition 2:
9Proposition 2 (dry-ups)
Under assumption 1, 8RH > 3 2RL, problem (3) has at least two distinct solutions
with different level of liquidity.
This simply means that for any admissible low return (0  RL < 1) there is a threshold
for the high return (RH) from which these fundamentals lead to multiple equilibria.
Proof: Let G(RL;RH) denote the set of equilibria for these parameters. From (1), (7)
























The existence of a high-return threshold for multiple equilibria depends neither on the
assumptionthatutilityislogarithmicnoronthechoiceofparametervalues. Instead, itrelies
on the non-convexities due to positive externalities. As the key ingredient to the existence
of a high-liquidity equilibrium is agent H’s participation to the secondary market, the only
needed restriction in the general model is u
0
(0) not being too low17.
In the appendix, I propose a generalization of proposition 2 with respect to p; q; r; and
u(:), and I show that this result extend to the general model.
3.2 Externalities, self-insurance and welfare
This subsection studies the mechanisms by which endogenous liquidity dry-ups affects
welfare. The key starting point of this exercise is that, in this economy, the market may
fail to allocate resources efﬁciently. I ﬁrst state it formally, then give the main intuition
and propose a numerical illustration based on the same parameter values as those used for
ﬁgure 2.
Proposition 3 (market failure)
A liquidity dry-up is a Pareto-dominated equilibrium, both from an ex-ante and an
ex-post point of view.
Ex-post inefﬁciency means that conditionally on his type, no agent ends up better-
off18 in a liquidity dry-up than in the corresponding high-liquidity equilibrium. Ex-post
inefﬁciency of course implies ex-ante inefﬁciency: expected utility is lower in the case of
a dry-up.
Whenbothexist, howcaneveryagentbeworse-offingilliq(RL;RH)thaningliq(RL;RH)?
• First, because resources are wasted in the storage technology (long-run investment is
on average more productive).
17For instance, Inada conditions are sufﬁcient but not necessary.
18In fact, in this example, all types of agents are strictly worse-off in a dry-up.
10• Second, because self-insurance has negative externalities (it decreases ex-post mar-
ket participation which hinders risk sharing).
When an agent optimally chose to issue a claim on a high-return project, it increases aver-
age quality and all claims can be sold for a better price. The social beneﬁt is thus higher
than the individual cost. However, in a liquidity dry-up, liquidation is anticipated to be so
painful that agents optimally choose to self-insure. The fact is that being self-insured
prevents them ex post to issue claims on high-return projects. The social cost of self-
insurance is therefore higher than the private beneﬁt.
In order to illustrate this, it is useful to identify the ﬁrst best allocation of resources as
a benchmark.
The ﬁrst-best allocation
To help compare risk sharing across allocations, I deﬁne ex-interim and ex-post wealth as
follows:
(
Wj  1 l +lRj
W
j  1 l +LjP+(l  Lj)Rj
(8)
They are, respectively, the date-2 wealth of agent j computed at the beginning of date
1 (that is, before the liquidation decision) and the date-2 wealth of agent j computed at the
end of date 1 (that is, after liquidation decision).
At the ﬁrst-best allocation, aggregate output is maximized and agents are perfectly
insured. Output maximization requires that all agents invest their full endowment in the
risky technology (l = 1). As all ex-post agents have the same preference, full insurance
implies that they receive the same share of the pie.
The maximum per capita resources as of date 1 in the economy considered in ﬁg-
ure 2 is given by 0:5(WH +WL) = E[R] = 1:5, which allow for 0:75 unit of consumption
good available for consumption at each date for each agent. Of course, with this allo-
cation, marginal utility is equal across periods and states of nature, and ex-post wealth
is hence equal across agents (W
H = W
L). The corresponding date-0 expected utility is
UFB
0 =  1:15.
Table 1 displays such allocation19.
Table 1: The ﬁrst-best allocation (RH = 2:25 and RL = 0:75)
Ct j Date 1 Date 2
State H 0.75 0.75
State L 0.75 0.75
Wj W
j
RH = 2:25 1:5
RL = 0:75 1:5
In this allocation, per capita resources are maximal: 0:5(WH +WL) = E[R], consumption is equal across states
and date: Ct j = E[R]=2; 8t; j and the reached level of expected utility is UFB
0 =  1:15.
This allocation maximizes date-0 expected utility but is not ex-interim incentive com-
patible under the assumption of private information on project return. Indeed, if a planner
were to bundle these assets and sell them in the secondary market20, the corresponding unit
price would be PFB = E[R]. However, as RL < PFB < RH incentives to sell are distorted:
agents with high-return projects have an incentive to retain part of their projects as it is a
more efﬁcient way to provide for date-2 consumption needs. Consequently PFB cannot be
a competitive equilibrium price.
19It is easy to check that this allocation maximizes date-0 expected utility subject to the following aggregate
resources constraint only (0:5(C1L +C1H +C2L +C2H)  E[R]).
20A way to implement this allocation would be to do so and to share the proceeds equally.
11The competitive allocations
As depicted in ﬁgure 2, there are two stable competitive allocations when RH = 2:25 and
RL = 0:75.
In gliq, all resources are invested in the long run. From a date-1 perspective, and because
investment has been determined at date 0, it is as if agent H had a date-2 endowment of RH.
Of course, this agent wants to smooth consumption and wishes to transfer resources across
period. Because of adverse selection, he cannot do it 1 to 1: the rate of transformation is 1
to P
RH =0:56. This means that his investment is relatively illiquid and that issuing claims on
it is costly. However, such issuance has a positive externality on agent L, the lemon owner:
he does an arbitrage and transfers resources at the rate 1 to P
RL =1:67. Still, it is ex-ante and
ex-post incentive-compatible for agent H to issue claims on his projects. Ex ante because
liquidation still dominates storage and ex post because it is, in this case, the only way to
obtain consumption goods at date 1. The latter justiﬁcation is crucial and illustrate the fact
that long-term investment can be seen has a secondary-market-participation commitment
technology. So, in gliq, thanks to their decision to ex ante tie their hands, agents are ex
post pretty well insured: they still face the risks of project failure, but in that case they
take advantage of adverse selection and get compensated by a relatively high price on
the market. Furthermore, they do not face the risk to liquidate good assets in an illiquid
market21. Table 2 displays this allocation.
Table 2: The high-liquidity competitive allocation (gliq)
Ct j Date 1 Date 2
State H 0.625 1.125
State L 0.625 0.625
Wj W
j
RH = 2:25 1:75
RL = 0:75 1:25
In this allocation, the size of the pie is still maximum (0:5(WH +WL) = 1:5) but the market fails to share it
equally (W
H > W
L). As a consequence, expected utility is lower: U
gliq
0 =  1:29. However, the market still
provides some insurance as there is a positive transfer of resources from the “lucky” state H to the “unlucky” state
L (WH  W
H =W
L  WL = 0:5).
On the other hand, in gilliq, agents anticipate that the secondary market will be illiquid
and will provide poor insurance. Accordingly, they optimally choose to compensate with
self-insurance: they use storage to hoard liquidity. This is a coordination failure: as no
agent ties his hands, there is individually no incentive to do so, and no one provides exter-
nalities in this low-liquidity equilibrium. Thus, paradoxically, when agents choose to self-
insure, they end-up rather poorly insured. They are not able anymore to transfer resources
from state H to state L (Wj =W
j ). Even worse, as long-term investment dominates storage,
self-insurance is wasteful and the size of the pie decreases. (0:5(WH +WL) = 1:22 < 1:5).
As a result of these two combined effects, expected utility drops further U
gilliq
0 =  2:21.
The low-liquidity competitive allocation is shown in table 3.
Table 3: The low-liquidity competitive allocation (gilliq)
Ct j Date 1 Date 2
State H 0:57 0:97





In this allocation, there is no transfer across states (Wj = W
j ) and the size of the pie is not maximized




The fact that liquidity hoarding might be wasteful is not new (see for instance Diamond
21There is empirical support for the pricing of such risk in ﬁnancial markets. See Acharya and Pedersen (2005).
12(1997), Holmström and Tirole (1998) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008)) and the
feedback effect between liquidity and investment is present in Eisfeldt (2004). However,
that liquidity dry-ups can endogenously arise for the very reason that investors self-insure
against it is a new result22.
Market failure opens the door to government intervention. This is the subject of the
next subsection.
3.3 The Government
Implementing the second-best allocation in the presence of positive externalities is a stan-
dard and rather simple problem23. I propose in this subsection a public liquidity insurance
scheme that enables the government to achieve such a goal. For simplicity, I do this under
assumption 1, but it can readily be extended to the general case. Also, I assume that the
fundamentals are such that a market failure is possible24.
The public liquidity insurance
The idea for the insurance is extremely simple. The bad equilibrium is a coordination fail-
ure, which happen when investors fear to have to sell claims in an illiquid market. There-
fore, if the government pledge to compensate them for the loss (with respect to storage)
in such a case, the incentive to self-insure vanishes and the only possible outcome is the
high-liquidity equilibrium. Of course, this result rely on the possibility for the government
to levy a break-even lump-sum tax after observing aggregate agent behavior. This is the
reason why a private agent could not do it (the reader might want to check that the tax
scheme is not incentive compatible). This public liquidity insurance is actually very simi-
lar to Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) demand deposit insurance with the same assumptions
about the ﬁscal ability of the Government
Proposition 4 (public insurance)
The public liquidity insurance implements the second-best.
Formal proof: see appendix.
Here is the intuition. Under this public liquidity insurance, the ex-ante trade-off be-
tween return and liquidity (with respect to storage) disappears and the date-0 ﬁrst order




Whatever the anticipated date-1 market price, l = 1 maximizes expected utility. Hence, it
is a dominant strategy to be fully invested in the long-term technology. Under this scheme,
the only one equilibrium corresponds to gliq(RL;RH) and the insurance is never claimed.
As in Dybvig and Spatt (1983), such an insurance is thus free.
The Pareto improvement through public liquidity provision absent aggregate shocks
departs from the literature. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Holmström and Tirole
(1998), there is a role for the government only in the case of aggregate uncertainty about
the fundamentals. This discrepancy might be understood when related to Allen and Gale
(2003). They show that under complete markets for aggregate risk, if intermediaries can
offer complete contracts, the equilibrium is incentive-efﬁcient (corresponds to the ﬁrst-best
allocation). When contracts are incomplete (they focus on demand-deposit contracts) the
22The traditional tool used to generate liquidity dry-ups is cash-in-the-market pricing. See the following section
for intuition and references.
23See Dybvig and Spatt (1983).
24That is: RH > 3 2RL, see proposition 2.
13equilibrium is constrained efﬁcient (second-best). However, if markets are not complete,
the outcome is generally inefﬁcient. In my model, demand-deposit contracts are exoge-
nously ruled-out and the market can fail, even under complete markets for aggregate risk.
Implementation
There are several ways to implement the public liquidity insurance. For instance, the gov-
ernment may pledge to buy any claim at a price of 1. Of course25, sellers would only claim






2 ;P < 1
0 ;P  1
Where t is the per capita lump-sum tax needed to fund the insurance.
The net effect of such a scheme is thus a transfer from agents that liquidate few to










0 ;P  1
Such a transfer is always feasible. As the incentive constraints are circumvented thanks
to government regalian power to raise lump-sum taxes, the only remaining issue is the
one of binding resource constraints. However, they will never be binding. First, from an
aggregate point of view, because the value of aggregate resources cannot decrease over
time. Second, from an individual point of view, because a highly negative transfer to agent
H would force him to liquidate part of its portfolio. This would trigger positive externalities
and increase the average value of traded claims which, in turn, would decrease the size of
the needed transfer and relax the government budget constraint. Consequently, agent H
could never run out of resources because of this scheme26.
Policy implications
During ﬁnancial crises, the fear of a credit crunch27 might lead to various public interven-
tions such as liquidity injection, bank recapitalization or even nationalization. To assess
them in the light of self-fulﬁlling liquidity dry-up mechanisms, it is ﬁrst important to note
that the public liquidity insurance is only effective ex ante. Assume the Government did
not commit to bail the market out and agents coordinated on the low-liquidity equilibrium.
It is still feasible to implement the scheme, but it would no longer be a Pareto improvement.
As all agents would be self-insured, there would be mostly lemons in the market, the public
intervention would not restore liquidity28, and the tax-payers would pay the burden of the
operation.
Since only the promise of a future market bailout could restore future liquidity in such
a world, it raises the question of moral hazard. This is indeed well known that public
intervention might induce investor to take on too much risk in the future29 and sow then the
seeds of the subsequent crisis. My results suggest the existence of an additional term to this
usual trade-off. Indeed, the public liquidity insurance improves expectations about market
25The following subsidy to liquidation (and a break even lump-sum tax) would lead to an equivalent outcome:
Subs(L) = minf(1 P);0)g
26Where agent H to liquidate its whole portfolio, the equilibrium price would be E[R] > 1 which is not consis-
tent with agents selling claims to the Government.
27See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1989) for an illustration of the ﬁnancial accelerator effect.
28While public interventions such as liquidity injections (through TARP for instance), eased the short-term
funding of ﬁnancial institution in the fall 2008, one might easily argue that they did not restore liquidity in the
securitized markets.
29See for instance Diamond (1984) and Freixas et al. (2004).
14liquidity, shifts investors horizon towards the long-run and actually avoids liquidity dry-
ups. So, this model advocates for policies that insure investors against sudden generalized
price drops but let them with enough long-run risk30. If the ﬂoor price is enough penalizing
with respect to average long-run returns, the moral hazard problem might be contained. In
a sense, the Government should design a policy that reduces enough adverse selection so
that it restores self-fulﬁlling market liquidity but not too much. Otherwise, agents will ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to game the system and invest in -or simply roll over- bad projects. Anyway,
the underlying moral hazard problem might be the price to pay to exit a ﬂight-to-liquidity
trap and avoid a credit crunch.31
If the government does not want to provide such insurance because of moral haz-
ard concerns, it might still try to forbid coordination mechanisms that would lead to a
liquidity-dry-up. A temporary ban on short-selling might be viewed as such an attempt (see
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) for an illustration that short-selling might coordinate a
switch toward a liquidity dry-up). Also, and more generally, lengthening investors horizon
might reduce adverse selection on asset markets. This improves liquidity and increases the
propensity to invest in long-term risky projects that are on average more productive than
short-term investment. If investors horizon is short, such socially proﬁtable opportunities
are not concreted and there is a welfare loss. According to that mechanism, the law-maker
should avoid policies that shorten investors horizon, as might for instance be the case with
policies based on mark-to-market accounting32. Finally, transaction taxes, which have been
considered as a mean to reduce speculation and promote long-term investment (see for in-
stance Tobin (1974) and Stiglitz (1989)) might in fact prove counter-productive: it would
decrease liquidity and could reduce the propensity to invest in long-term projects (through
an increase in self-insurance) which would deter liquidity further.
4 Liquidity dry-ups and the 2007-ongoing ﬁnancial crisis
The literature on ﬁnancial crises is abundant and is considerably expanding since Summer
2007 and the beginning of the current crisis33. In this section, I show how the model can
contribute to the understanding of the persistence of the securitization markets breakdown.
Stylized facts
Consider the following stylized observations related to the crisis (supporting tables and
graphs can be found in the Appendix):
1. MARKETS BREAKDOWN. The Asset Backed Securities (ABS) business collapsed
and has not recovered yet: prices dramatically dropped and so did new issuance.
2. LOW PRICES. Recent prices seem to be “too low” with respect to fundamentals. For
instance, according to the computations of the Bank of England (2008), the Spring
2008 prices of the ABX.HE index34 implied an expected loss of 38% on subprime
30An alternative would be to ensure that ﬁnancial supervision is able to detect such behaviors. However, one
might cast some serious doubts on the implementability of such efﬁcient supervision when ﬁnancial innovations
are endogenous to the regulatory and supervision environment.
31These results are related to the policy recommendations of Ricardo Caballero about the 2007-2008 ﬁnancial
turmoil. He indeed advocated for not caring so much about moral hazard during ﬁnancial crisis (Financial Times,
August 08), and he for instance proposed, in order to launch a virtuous circle, that: “The government pledges to
buy up to twice the number of shares currently available, at twice some recent average price, ﬁve years from now”
(VOX, 22 February 2009)
32Allen and Carletti (2008b) shows that mark-to-market accounting is not desirable during cash-in-the-market
pricing episode. My results suggest that it might also have an impact on the ex-ante propensity to invest in
long-run productive projects.
33See Brunnermeier (2009) for a chronology of the crisis and Allen and Carletti (2008) for a focus on liquidity
issues.
34http://www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/structured-ﬁnance-indices/abx/documentation.page?#. See
Gorton (2008) for a description.
15mortgages, which could correspond to a 76% foreclosure rate with a 50% recovery
value. Both being not really credible, according to that report. In June 2009, the
ABX.HE prices were even lower and the foreclosure rate on subprime mortgages had
“only” hiked to around 20%. This “underpricing” view might be all wrong, but since
it is shared by a number of key observers (central bankers and leading academics35
for instance), it is at least worth to confront it to economic theory.
3. LIQUIDITY HOARDING. From September 2008, there has been a dramatic in-
crease of aggregate excess reserves of the major deposit institutions in the US: it
increased by a factor bigger than 18. Also, despite the huge increase in supply (both
from the FED and the US Government), T-Bills prices have been and are still high.
Therefore, the demand for short term safe assets should have been very high too.
Cash-in-the-market Pricing and the Unfolding of a Crisis
One of the classic view on facts 1 and 2 is that the market incurred an episode of cash-
in-the-market pricing (Allen and Gale, 1994). The idea is the following: there is an op-
portunity cost to hoard cash if the alternative, a productive long-term asset, has a higher
expected return. This cost should be compensated by gains in some states of the world.
These gains are realized when there are “many” sellers of the long-term asset. In this case,
as the demand is limited by the amount of cash hoarded, the price might drop below the
fundamental value.
This mechanism seems particularly appealing to explain sudden price drops and can
also be extended to generate downward price spirals36. Clearly, there were episodes of
the crisis that had such a ﬂavor, and these models seem therefore good at capturing the
unfolding of liquidity crisis.
Cash-In-The-Market (CITM) models are, by construction, designed to capture short-
term phenomena. The assumption that there is no access to any external funding is indeed
an application of the limits of arbitrage put forward by Shleiffer and Vishny (1997). How-
ever, such limits are likely to fade away time and the assumption would be less reasonable
in a model that would seek to explain (really) persistent phenomena.
The presence of deep-pocket agents in my model is thus interesting with two respects.
First, it neutralizes the well known CITM channel and permits thus to isolate adverse se-
lection effects. Second, the results are more likely to give us relevant insights on crisis
persistence, as they do not rely on the short-run inelasticity of funding. This is what I
expose in the next subsection.
Adverse Selection, Liquidity Premium and the Persistence of a Crisis
Think of ﬁnancial institutions, including their off-balance structured investment vehicles,
as the investors of my model37. If they anticipate future market illiquidity, it is optimal for
35For instance, Allen and Carletti (2008) endorse the analysis of the BoE and Uhlig (2009) states that prices
appear low compared to some benchmark fundamental value.
36Cash-in-the-market and similar mechanisms have been used in the literature to “generate” liquidity dry-ups
and related events. In Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2009), adverse selection is combined with cash-in-the-
market pricing to deliver multiple equilibria with prices below fundamentals. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), arbitrageur have limited resources and face margin calls from their funding institutions. When these
margin calls increase with volatility, they create a liquidity spiral and assets might be traded below fundamental
value. Morris and Shin (2004) and Genotte-Leland (1990) can also be understood in a similar way: there is a
given downward sloping demand curve and arbitrageurs face resource constraints that are functions of price.
37Investors would correspond to ﬁnancial institutions that have limited resources that they lend to private agents
(mortgages or corporate loans for instance). Only these institutions have the needed skills to screen applicants.
Proper screening is assumed costly so that a moral hazard problem prevents them to do it within a principal-
agent relationship. However, monitoring of ongoing projects is assumed costless and the moral hazard problem
does not apply after the investment is indeed committed. The secondary market can therefore be viewed as the
securitization and sale of the initial loans. Buffer agents could be, for instance, US pension funds or sovereign
funds from emerging or oil-exporting countries.
16them to hoard liquidity. If this belief is widespread in the economy, market illiquidity is
self-fulﬁlling since self-insured investors would never sell good assets at ﬁre-sale prices,
and buyers would infer that only lemons are tried to be sold. In this case, there is no reason
for a single institution to deviate from that behavior. Indeed, if one of them would choose to
be highly invested in long-term assets, it would face an illiquid market in the future. Even
if its reason to sell is “legitimate” (a good investment opportunity for instance), it would be
suspected to be trying to pass on a lemon. Such adverse-selection-driven illiquidity story
is consistent with facts 1 and 2 together with fact 3. Indeed, the low-liquidity equilibrium
of the model exhibits low volume and low prices, down to a level lower than average
fundamental price38, together with liquidity hoarding behavior and despite the presence of
deep-pocket agents.
Of course, the framework is by far too stylized to be used to explain all features of the
crises. In the model, dry-ups are simply interpreted as being one of the possible equilibria.
Provided that the fundamentals are such that a dry-up is possible, pessimistic beliefs are
sufﬁcient for the economy to end up in this equilibrium. In that sense, the dynamics of
the dry-ups are not really elaborate. The comparative advantage of the model is therefore
not to describe the unfolding of a liquidity crisis. However, that adverse selection driven
illiquidity is self-fulﬁlling when agents decide to hoard liquidity is an important insight and
suggests that securitization markets need not automatically recover with time.
5 When illiquidity shocks improve... liquidity
In this section, I consider the case where investors face idiosyncratic preference shocks. At
date 1, they indeed learn whether they are normal or early consumers. The latter deriving
utility from consumption at date 2 only. While the presence of such early agents is not
necessary to the existence of liquidity dry-ups, it still has an impact on market liquidity and
hence risk sharing. In the classic banking literature, such preference shocks are interpreted
asilliquidityshocksandincentivecompatibilityproblemsarisewhenpatientagentspretend
they are impatient (see for instance Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1987)). This
might generate bank runs and hinder the ability of deposit contracts to improve risk sharing.
When ex-ante pooling of resources is ruled out and when private information about fu-
ture payoffs is already a source of adverse selection, I ﬁnd that private information about
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks enhances market liquidity. Adverse selection is indeed re-
duced because illiquid agents issue claims irrespective of the underlying project return.
As market liquidity improves risk sharing, this suggests that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
need not be socially a bad thing39.
Introducing illiquidity shocks also permits to study the question of transparency40. I
show in subsection 5.2 that transparency about liquidity position has two effects. First, it
decreases the liquidity discount for “illiquid” investors41. This can be counter-intuitive, but
it explains why sellers on a secondary market often pretend they sell for reasons exogenous
to the asset’s quality42. Second, transparency increases the liquidity discount for the others
investors: as they did not incur a liquidity shock, it is more likely that they sell because of
adverse selection. As a consequence, the effect of transparency on ex-ante risk sharing is
38The underlying assumption the BoE’s computation is that traded assets are a representative sample of the
whole set of existing ones. This kind of Mark-to-Market valuation procedure is of course biased in presence of
adverse selection: retained assets are on average better than traded ones.
39In the June 2009 release of its Financial Stability Report, the Bank of England calls for a better self-insurance
against such shocks. As we have seen, such a policy might have serious drawbacks with respect to future market
liquidity, which is likely to affect long-term investment.
40This is relevant because the lack of transparency as been widely blamed for the current crisis.
41 IthankJeanTiroleforpointingoutthisrelationshipbetweenliquiditypositiondisclosureandmarketliquidity
discount, as well as for the example below.
42For instance, in their ads for second-hand cars, student often mention that they want to sell because they are
graduating and moving out of town.
17ambiguous, as suggested by Holmström (2008).
Formally, in this extension, agents differ by the subjective factor b they use to discount
date-2 utility: b 2 f0;1g with Prob(b = 1) = p and 0 < p < 1. Also, for the sake of
simplicity, I keep the assumption that period utility is logarithmic and that projects succeed
or fail with equal probabilities.
The machinery of the model is basically the same, the major difference is that there are
now four types of agents as of date 1. Agents indeed differ on two dimensions: project
return Rj and patience bi. From here onward, I will name agents after their type ij where
j still reﬂects projects return and i = e;n accounts for early (be = 0) and normal (bn = 1)
agents respectively. Indexes on date-1 decision variables are modiﬁed accordingly.
5.1 Equilibrium with illiquidity shocks
Investors are still ex-ante identical. They solve:
max
l;Lij;Sij





C1ij +Sij = 1 l +LijP
C2ij = (l  Lij)Rj +Sij
0  Lij  l  1
Where i 2 fe;ngwith Prob(i = n) = p > 0, be = 0 and bn = 1, and j 2 fL;Hgwith
Prob(j = H) = 0:5.
While the liquidation decision of normal agents (nL and nH) are still given by (4) and
(5), those of early agents (eL and eH) are now determined by their ﬁrst order condition for
Lej = l, which always holds:
P
C1ej  0 ; j = H;L
As they only care about utility of consumption at date 1, they sell off any project they
hold, whatever the quality43:
LeH(P;l) = LeL(P;l) = l
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hliq =
2 p






Which implies that equilibrium market liquidity depends on p. Equilibrium prices are






It follows that for any admissible value of p and RL there is a range for RH that implies
multiple equilibria (see appendix for the proof). And the two possible levels of liquidity in









4 p ;P > 1
43Again, if P = RL they are indifferent, in which case I assume for simplicity that they liquidate their whole
position.
18Effect on equilibrium market liquidity
I present here a short comparative statics exercise.
Proposition 5 (market liquidity)
For any admissible value of RL, as the probability (1  p) of being hit by an illiquidity
shock increases:
1. Equilibrium market liquidity increases:
¶h
¶(1 p) > 0
2. The range for a high-liquidity equilibrium increases
3. The range for a low equilibrium decreases
Proof: straightforward.
First, it might appear counter-intuitive but illiquidity shocks enhance market liquidity.
In fact, investors hit by such shocks liquidate assets irrespective of their quality. As a
consequence, average quality increases with 1  p, which is also the proportion of early
agents. Second, when this proportion increases, a lower RH is needed for a high-liquidity
equilibrium to exist. As early agent’s liquidation behavior imply more units of claims to
high-return projects, a lower return par unit is needed to bring the price up to 1. Third,
as soon as p < 1, there are always claims to high-return projects that are traded. So, if
RH is sufﬁciently high for the price at the low level of market liquidity to be higher than
1, it cannot be an equilibrium. Obviously, the more the early agents, the lower that upper
bound.
The lower bound for a high-liquidity equilibrium is RH(p;RL)  RL +
4 p
2 p(1 RL).
The upper bound for a low-liquidity equilibrium is RH(p;RL)  RL +
2 p
1 p(1 RL). For a
given p, they deﬁne three regions in the space of admissible parameter values for RH and
RL. Figure 3 illustrates this for p = 0:5.
Figure 3: 3 regions (p = 0:5)
This ﬁgure presents the three regions that deﬁne multiplicity of equilibrium. As (1  p) increases, the low-
liquidity-equilibrium region (delimited by the solid lines) shrinks and the high-liquidity-equilibrium one (dashed
lines) widens. The overlap is the region with multiple equilibria.
Impact on risk sharing
To interpret the implications of the presence of illiquidity shock on the risk sharing, I ﬁrst
generalize (8), to the four-agent case:
19(
Wij  1 l +lRj
W
ij  1 l +LijP+(l  Lij)Rj
And I deﬁne the wealth gains from trade as the difference between the two: fij 
W
ij  Wij = Lij(P Rj).
Corollary 1
For any given ex-post agent, the wealth gains from trade increases with the proportion
of early agents:
¶fij
¶(1 p)  0, 8ij
Proof: see appendix. Conditionally of being of any given type, ex-post wealth increases
with liquidity. How can it be possible? Here is the intuition: The mass of agents in state
eH increases, so they provide more externalities on aggregate (to other type of agents and
among themselves). This increase in positive externalities suggest a better risk sharing.
Indeed, the unlucky lemon owners (eL and nL) beneﬁt from a bigger transfer. However,
in the high-liquidity equilibrium, agents nH, which were already the best-off, also take an
advantage thereof. This is depicted, for a high-liquidity equilibrium, in ﬁgure4.
Figure 4: The effect of an decrease in p on ex-post wealth
This ﬁgure illustrates, in a high liquidity equilibrium, the effect on ex-post wealth of an increase in the probability
of being an early consumer (1 p). As p decreases to p0, the mass of agents nH decreases, but liquidity increases
and ex-post wealth increases for all type of agents.
In other words, an increase in 1  p (the probability of being hit by a liquidity shock),
enhance risk sharing across types, on the project return dimension (from iH to iL thus) but
deteriorates risk sharing across types, on the patience dimension44. Note that in a low-
liquidity equilibrium, as there is limited participation, agent nH does not take advantage of
the increase in liquidity.
This comparative statics exercise does not directly apply to ex-ante welfare as a change
in p as an impact on the expected utility function itself. Nevertheless, it is still worth trying
to disentangle the different forces at stake:
• When there are illiquidity shocks, liquidity increases and it becomes less costly to
transfer resources intertemporally which is likely to be welfare improving45.
44Table 4, in the appendix, displays the high-liquidity competitive allocation as a function of p.
45The best way to illustrate it is to let p go to 0. In that case, the market price is E[R] and all agents have the
same ex-post wealth. Note that this ﬁrst best allocation does not exactly correspond to the one of section 3 as
agents decide to consume at date 1 only.
20• There isa cross-subsidy from “lucky”high-return project owners to“unlucky” lemon
owners. As long as moral hazard is not concerned, this is also likely to improve
welfare.
• There might be a cross subsidy from agents incurring the liquidity shock to the best-
off agents. This is generally ex-ante undesirable.
The conclusion of this subsection is that the existence of idiosyncratic illiquidity shocks
need not be socially a “bad thing” once market liquidity considerations are taken into ac-
count.
5.2 Transparency and liquidity
Now, still in the model with illiquidity shocks, I assume that there exists a technology that
enables agents to credibly disclose their patience parameter bi. What I have in mind is for
instance a bank that could credibly disclose its liquidity position. In that case, buyers are
able to classify sellers in two categories and they update their priors about average quality
accordingly. There are thus two separated markets.
Proposition 6 (transparency)
Early agents are better-off disclosing their liquidity position
Proof (for the high-liquidity equilibrium case): Assume disclosure and let h
e and P
e
denote equilibrium liquidity and price, conditionally on the seller to be illiquid (to be an




e = E[R] > P
liq with P
liq = RL +h
liq(RH  RL) being the equilibrium price without
disclosure. Therefore, as these agents get a better price, their ex-post wealth increase, they
are better-off and they have no incentive to deviate (that is, to issue claims without liquidity
position disclosure).




liq(p<1)) and they are thus worse-off under disclosure. In that sense,
transparency modify ex-ante risk-sharing opportunities and might deteriorate liquidity. The
view that it is not the lack of transparency but rather the asymmetry of information that can
cause illiquidity is expressed by Gorton (2008) and Holmström (2008). An extreme way to
show this in my model is the following: imagine for a moment that agents only learn the
quality of their projects between date 1 and date 2. Under such an assumption, agents are
less informed but adverse selection is not an issue anymore and the ﬁrst best allocation is
the only equilibrium of the model.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown the major role adverse selection plays in self-fulﬁlling liquidity
dry-ups. In normal times, the feedback effect between liquidity and investment magniﬁes
the externalities linked to the issuance of good quality claims for consumption reallocation
motives. However, the anticipation of a dry-up sufﬁces to reverse the process: the feedback
effect magniﬁes the negative externalities linked to self-insurance. This sheds new light on
ﬁnancial crises. The result that the promise of a market bailout implements the second-
best might be important as well. Indeed, most of the debates on public intervention during
ﬁnancial crises focus on moral hazard, and the implications of adverse selection have been
rather overlooked.
This mechanism seems powerful but the model does not help to assess the magnitude
of the potential welfare gain in comparison with welfare losses usually attributed to moral
hazard. Still, I suspect that the introduction of moral hazard would not negate the results
and that it is worth extending the model in that direction. This view is based on the fact
21that, even in the high-liquidity equilibrium, agents are only partially insured. There is
thus still room for incentive to exert effort or to prevent risk-shifting. On the other hand,
aggregate shocks to preferences or productivity might also have a negative impact on the
government budget constraint and the public liquidity insurance would probably need to be
more sophisticated to ensure that this constraint is satisﬁed in all states of nature.
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23A Appendix: Stylized Facts
Here is the ﬁrst line of the 2008 Global Securitisation Annual Edited by Barclays Capital
Research:
“2008 may well become known in the global securitisation markets as the
annus horribilis.”
Figure 5: Collapse of the securitization business
This ﬁgure displays the shrinkage of the balance sheet of ABS issuers.
Source: www.federalreserve.org
Underpricing of ABX Subprime index. Source: BoF Financial Stability Review October 2008
24Figure 6: Fundamentals
(a) Delinquency rates
Delinquency rates on subprime (left panel) and prime (right panel) residential mortgages in the US. Source:
www.bloomberg.com
(b) Foreclosure rates
Foreclosure rates on subprime (left panel) and prime (right panel) residential mortgages in the US. Source:
www.bloomberg.com
Figure 7
While excess reserve never exceeded 10% of required reserves between January 2007 and August 2008, then it
skyrocketed to more than 1000%. Source: http://www.federalreserve.org.
25Figure 8
(a) Holdings of Treasury Securities
Figure 8a shows that Treasury securities issuance has been rather high as from 2008Q3. It also shows that the
Household sector (which includes domestic hedge funds) and the Rest of the World are still big players on the
demand side. Source: http://www.federalreserve.org.
(b) Yield on short-term (4w) Treasury Bills.
Figure 8b shows that despite the surge in supply there are still enough buyers of such assets for the yield to stay
low, i.e. close to the Fed Funds target rate, without requiring that the Monetary Authorities increases
substantially its position. Source: www.federalreserve.org.
26B Appendix: proofs
B.1 Proof of proposition 1 (self-insurance)
Proposition 1 (self-insurance)
Let l(P)  argmax
l





l(P > 1) = f1g












j (P)  argmaxl ln((1 l)P)+ln(lRj) the optimal investment level condition-






1 ;P > 1
f[0;1]g ;P = 1











0:5 ;P < 1
The cases for P > 1 and P = 1 are straightforward.







be the marginal utility of l conditionally of























B.2 Proof of proposition 2 (Dry-ups)














First show that the lower bound on RH for the existence of a high-liquidity equilibrium
is decreasing in 1  p:
Deﬁne R(p)  RL +
1 RL





¶p < 0 and 8RH  R(p),
RL+hliq(p)(RH  RL)  1.
Then show that there is an upper bound for the existence of a low-liquidity equilibrium
and that it is decreasing in 1  p:
27Deﬁne R(p)  RL +
1 RL





¶p < 0 and 8RH  R(p),
RL+hilliq(p)(RH  RL)  1.
These do the proof.
B.3 Dry-ups: conditions for multiple equilibria in the general model








C1ij +Sij = 1 l +LijP
C2ij = (l  L)Rj +Sij(1+r)
0  Lij  l  1
Where i 2 fe;ngwith be = 0, bn = 1 and Prob(i = n) = p > 0, and j 2 fL;Hgwith
Prob(j = H) = q and 0 < q < 1.
Proposition 2bis (dry-ups generalized)
Let ¯ W be the range of admissible values46 for parametersfRL;p;q;rg. Let G(W;RH) =
f(P;l;h)g denote the set of stable equilibria deﬁned by (2) for a vector (W 2 ¯ W;RH) of
parameters. Assume u0(0) > u0(RH)
RH
RL .
8W 2 ¯ W, 9RH < RH such that 8RH 2]RH;RH[, G(W;RH) has at least two distinct ele-























































l)P)+u(lRH) being the optimal endowment share invested in the long-run technology,
for a given P and conditionally on being of type nH.
Before turning to the core of the proof, I establish the continuity of P
0
liq(P;RH) and the








This (mild) condition will ensure C
1;nH > 0, that is I rule out the case where agent nH
optimally chooses not to consume at date 1.
Lemma 1 (liquidity dominance)
Under condition 1,
hilliq < hliq(P;RH) < q;
8P  1+r.
460 < p  1; 0 < q < 1; 0  RL < 1+r; r >  1
28Proof: First, from l
nH 2 [0;1], I have:
hilliq  hliq(P;RH) < q






Pliq(P;RH), 8P  1+r. This, in turn,
implies that l








liq is a continuous function of l
nH(P;RH). The implicit functions
theorem applied to the ﬁrst order condition for an interior l
nH ensures that l
ns(P;RH) is
continuous in both its arguments which implies Lemma 2.
Proof (of proposition 2bis): As I only consider stable equilibria, I am not interested in




















and show that there exists a range of RH that generates at least an
equilibrium for both functions:
The upper bound for a low-liquidity equilibrium Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem gives










L(P;RH) = P () RH  RL+
(1+r)2 RL
hilliq .
There exists thus a unique low-liquidity equilibrium if and only if RH is low enough,




The lower bound for a high-liquidity equilibrium: In order to derive a sufﬁcient con-
dition for the existence of a ﬁxed point P
0
liq(P;RH) = P, I construct a function G(P;RH) 
P P
0






. Clearly, given the continuity
of P
0
































For any RH, given (10), a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a high-liquidity equi-
librium is thus:
G((1+r);RH)  0









As hliq(P;RH) is bounded, there will always exist a RH high enough such that condition
(11) is satisﬁed. Yet, I am interested in a lower bound on RH for this condition to hold.
That is, a RH such that:
8RH  RH; RH  RL+
(1+r)2 RL
hliq(1+r;RH)





1, it is bounded below by RL+
(1+r)2 RL
q and above by RL+
(1+r)2 RL
hilliq . Also, given Lemma








For a wide class of utility functions47, hliq(P;RH) is monotonic in RH. It implies
that there is a unique ﬁxed point; call it R
0
















this unique ﬁxed point is a lower bound on RH for the existence of a high-liquidity equi-
librium. I can thus choose RH  R
0
H. If there are multiple ﬁxed points, the correct lower













The range for multiple equilibria Lemma 1 implies RH < RH which concludes the
proof: 8RH 2]RH;RH[ there exists at least two equilibria.
B.4 Proof of proposition 3 (market failure)
A liquidity dry-up is a Pareto-dominated equilibrium, both from an ex-ante and an ex-post
point of view.


















t j the optimal consumption of agent j at date t in equilibrium g.
If both agents are better-off in gliq, it ex-post Pareto dominates gilliq.
















47Including CARA, CRRA and quadratic utility functions.
30ii) Agent H is better-off
If S








2H = ˜ lRH +S
1
































2H as ˜ l < 1 and S
1  0. So, the optimal choice of this agent in gilliq is
still feasible and lets some spare resources. He can thus do strictly better than in gilliq.
If utility is strictly higher in all states of the world (L and H), gliq Pareto dominates gilliq
, both ex-ante and ex-post.
B.5 Proof of proposition 4 (public liquidity insurance)
Under this liquidity insurance, date-1 budget constraints are then contingent to P:

C1+S1 = 1 l +Lmax(P;1) t(P)






2 ;P < 1
0 ;P  1
It simply states that if the market liquidation price is low, agents will have to pay t(P)
but they will also be compensated for the loss of value with respect to the opportunity cost
- the return on storage.
Of course, I still have: L
L(P) = l(P). Such a subsidy will not decrease the willing to
liquidate of these agents.
Thus:
(
C1+S1 = 1 l +l max(P;1) t(P)
C2 = (l  L)Rj +S1











The return-liquidity trade-off has well disappeared. As it is true irrespective to the compet-
itive market price, l = 1 is a dominant strategy.
Conditionally on H, there are two cases depending on P:
If P  1, the budget constraints are:
(
C1 = 1 l +max(l  1=2;0)P
C2 = (l  max(l  1=2;0))RH
31From this, I can consider the ﬁrst order condition of problem (9) with respect to l:
• if l > 1






• if l  1





If P < 1, the budget constraints are:
(
C1 = 1 l +L t
C2 = (l  L)RH
Which implies the following on the ﬁrst order condition of problem (9) with respect to
l:
• if l > 1 t






• if l < 1 t













Which concludes the proof.
B.6 Proof of Corollary 1
The fourth column of table 4 gives the fij as a function p. To obtain corollary 1, just derive
with respect to (1  p).
Table 4: Resources across states with private info over bi






















































32C Appendix to section 3.1: Unstable equilibria
There are several ways to interpret this equilibrium: for instance, it can be seen as a Nash
equilibrium in pure or mixed strategy. In this equilibrium, agents expect P = 1. They
are therefore indifferent with respect to investment choice over a wide range of value:




. At date 1, I have LL(1;l) = l and LH(1;l) = l  0:5. To indeed have
P = 1 as an outcome, the actual investment density function f(x) deﬁned over the interval 1
2;1

should be such that: RL+hf(x)(RH  RL) = 1. With hf(x) being the level of liquidity





In the example of ﬁgure 2, one could for instance consider the degenerate distribution:
f(x) =
(
1 ; x = 5=8
0 ; x 6= 5=8
Which gives hf(x) = 1=6 and indeed P = 1.
Obviously, in such cases, any small perturbation (to the expected price for instance)
would switch the best response to either l(P > 1) = 1 or l(P < 1) < ¯ l
1 and best re-
sponse iteration would never bring the economy back to g1.
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